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Abstract 
A long-standing theory in family demography points out that marriage rates for both men 
and women are affected by the number of suitable marriage partners available in the local 
marriage market. In its most basic form, the marriage squeeze hypothesis holds that 
marriage prospects are lower if the number of unmarried persons of the desired age is low. 
We propose to update the concept of the marriage squeeze in ways that make it more 
relevant for partnership and family formation today. This entails at least two things. First, 
given the increasing importance of unmarried cohabitation and given the fact that a growing 
proportion of children are born outside marriage in Europe, the concept and idea of the 
"marriage squeeze" should be broadened to include the effects of age-specific sex ratio 
imbalances on the "mating market" rather than on the marriage market only. That is: we 
should incorporate unmarried cohabitation. Second, education should be added to the 
dimensions of age and sex to quantify the mating squeeze in a more meaningful way. The 
expansion of higher education among women implies that women who want to find a male 
partner with the same or a higher level of educational attainment would increasingly 
experience an education-specific mating squeeze. Therefore, this paper reviews ways of 
measuring the education-specific mating squeeze and presents time series of measurements 
based on alternative methods and two different sources: the European Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) and Eurostat official statistics on population by five years age groups and sex.  
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1. Introduction 
A long-standing theory in family demography states that marriage rates for both men and 
women are affected by the number of suitable marriage partners available in the local 
marriage market. In its most basic form, the marriage squeeze hypothesis holds that marriage 
prospects are lower if the number of unmarried persons of the desired age is low, all else 
equal. Conversely, marriage rates are expected to be higher, all else equal, if the number of 
potential spouses is higher. 
This paper extends and updates the marriage squeeze hypothesis, mainly by including 
unmarried cohabitation and by taking into account educational assortative mating, i.e., the 
tendency that like matches like in terms of educational attainment (Schwartz & Mare, 2005). 
We designate the updated hypothesis as the education-specific mating squeeze hypothesis: 
rates of union formation (including unmarried cohabitation as well as marriage) with a partner 
of the desired educational attainment are expected to be lower for those who suffer a mating 
squeeze, i.e., for those who have a limited number of potential partners with the desired level 
of education. This dimension is particularly relevant, given that thereversal of gender 
inequality in education, with women now being more highly educated than men, implies that 
in particular highly educated women are increasingly suffering an education-specific mating 
squeeze (Van Bavel, 2012). 
The aim of the paper is to review methods to measure the mating squeeze, both 
generally and when taking into account educational assortative mating. We only consider 
opposite-sex matches and disregard homosexual union formation. The following section 
presents a brief history of the concept of the marriage squeeze (which is here extended to 
include unmarried cohabitation). Next, major approaches to measuring the mating squeeze are 
outlined. Finally, we apply some of the approaches to Labour Force Survey data in order to 
estimate recent trends in mating squeeze in a range of European countries and discuss the 
practical implications and conceptual issues that arise when using different sex ratio 
measures. 
 
2. Concepts of marriage squeeze: A brief history 
The concept of marriage squeeze has been adopted to refer to the effect of an imbalance in the 
number of men and women on the timing and likelihood of marriage. Already in a paper 
published in 1953, John Hajnal commented that ages at marriage and the proportions 
marrying may be affected by the sex ratio at marriageable ages. The period of writing, just 
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after the Second World War, was characterized by high marriage rates, increasing fertility 
rates and economic growth.  
After the so called ‘Golden Age of Marriage’ of the 1950s, marriage rates dropped and 
age at marriage increased. In this timeframe the term marriage squeeze was introduced by 
Glick, Heer and Beresford (1963) to refer to the effect of an imbalance between the number of 
males and females on marriage. They observed that the sharp rise in birth rates during the 
postwar baby boom combined with the almost universal custom that women marry men who 
are on average two or three years older, resulted in an imbalance between the number of 
potential brides and the number of potential grooms, twenty years later. This shortage of 
suitably aged men placed women in a marriage squeeze. Several scholars have proposed 
definitions and measurements of the marriage squeeze. Akers (1967), Muhsam (1974), 
Goldman, Westoff and Hammerslough (1984) and  Schoen (1983) were the first to make a 
quantitative assessment of the marriage squeeze. Although using different approaches to 
measure the marriage squeeze, they validated the importance of mate availability for marriage 
behavior, especially for age at marriage.  
Despite the surplus of women, marriage rates and age at marriage also decreased for 
men during the 1970s, which could not be explained by the marriage squeeze. According to 
Guttentag and Secord (1983), the basic marriage squeeze hypothesis fell short because it 
ignores the psychological, economic and social conditions that moderate the simple rules of 
supply and demand. In their book Too many women? The sex ratio question, they provide a 
theoretical framework on how an imbalance in the number of men and women influence 
gender roles and partnering behaviour. This perspective, known in the literature as the 
sociocultural perspective or the imbalanced sex ratio perspective, assumes that men and 
women react differently to sex ratio imbalances. Because men mainly are in control of 
structural power, marriage is less a matter of urgency for men than for women. As a result, an 
abundance of mate availability is expected to discourage men to commit to one woman while 
a shortage of women is expected to encourages men to make and keep that commitment. In 
other words, Guttentag and Secord (1983) posit a different reaction to the marriage squeeze 
for men and women: when there are fewer men than women, expected marriage rates for 
women are low but the rates for men are expected to be low as well. The latter expectation is 
in contrast to what is presumed from the gender neutral marriage squeeze hypothesis. 
Conversely, when women are scarce, marriage rates are expected to be high for women as 
well as for men. So, Guttentag and Second predicted a positive effect of mate availability on 
women’s marriage rates but a negative effect of mate availability on men’s marriage rates. 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the continuing retreat from marriage, together with 
the rise of single female headed families among African Americans in the United States, 
raised new questions. Numerous studies addressed these issues and tried to explain lower 
marriage rates, higher divorce rates, and higher illegitimacy rates for black women. Some 
authors argued that most studies failed to make the link with crucial dimensions of the social 
demography of African American families. Spanier and Glick (1980) as well as Guttentag & 
Secord (1983) hypothesized that high mortality rates among black men implied that sex ratios 
for black women were strongly imbalanced. After considering mortality rates, the concept of 
the marriage squeeze proved to be useful in explaining racial differences in female marriage 
behaviour. 
Wilson (1987) took this a step further and emphasized the desired characteristics of 
potential spouses instead of the sheer number. He demonstrated that the rise in female-headed 
families among African Americans was related to increasing joblessness among black males. 
High black-male unemployment rates combined with high black-male mortality rates reduced 
the proportion of black men who were in the position to support a family. Wilson (1987) 
computed the marriage squeeze by dividing the number of employed men by the number of 
women and referred to this as the male marriageable pool index. He showed that a shortage of 
black men with desirable economic qualities lowered black women marriage rates.  
Wilson’s contribution revitalized research on the marriage squeeze. The emphasis on 
the lack of “high quality” black males shifted the argument from availability to suitability. As 
a result, the marriage squeeze was no longer just a matter of the sheer number of men and 
women who can potentially form a relationship, but also a matter of suitability in terms of 
socioeconomic qualities. Beside employment status, other characteristics, such as income 
level (Lichter et al., 1992; 1995) and educational level (Goldman et al., 1984; Schoen & 
Kluegel, 1988; South & Lloyd, 1992) were introduced as relevant dimensions of “the quality” 
of men.  
Apart from Guttentag and Secord (1983), Oppenheimer (1988) provided a major new 
theoretical framework on how population composition influences the timing and likelihood of 
marriage. She stated that whether and when a mate is found depends on the efficiency of the 
selection or search process. This efficiency is determined by the number of potential suitable 
partners and by the knowledge about their suitability. Her marital search theory contradicted 
the conventional wisdom that the continuing retreat from marriage could be ascribed to the 
masculinization of women’s economic life and that women’s enhanced economic 
opportunities reduced the financial incentives to marry. Instead, she  suggested to focus not 
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only on men’s but also on women’s economic qualities and mate selection preferences (in 
contrast to the perspective on union formation by Becker (1981) which focused on the 
exchange of men’s work on the labour market with women’s unpaid domestic work).  
After Wilson’s and Oppenheimer’s contributions, the next step was to connect the 
marriage squeeze hypothesis with patterns of assortative mating. First, Lichter, Anderson and 
Hayward (1995) questioned whether a shortage of marriageable men not only changes 
marriage rates but also changes the characteristics of the men women marry. They stated that 
when faced with a deficit of eligible men, women do not lower their marital preferences and 
marry men with low socioeconomic status, but rather choose to forgo marriage. Second, 
Albrecht et al. (1997) argued that although men prefer economically attractive women, they 
are not eager to marry women who greatly outrank them in education and women remain 
doubtful about marrying men with a lower educational level than themselves. Third, Qian 
(1998) concluded that owing to the rising number of highly educated women in the marriage 
market, educational hypogamy (women marrying down) has exceeded educational hypergamy 
(women marrying upwards). Finally, Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000) argued that local mate 
availability, rather than imbalanced sex ratios, influences educational sorting, and they found 
that the higher the concentration of equally or more highly educated potential mates, the lower 
is the likelihood of marrying down. Also Esteve, Garcia-Roman and Permanyer (2012) 
showed that the index of female educational advantage (see further p.11) is associated with 
the prevalence of hypergamy. 
In this strand of research, scholars have focused extensively on education. A major 
reason is its correlation with the socioeconomic status as well as with cultural and lifestyle 
preferences (Kalmijn, 1991) and the implied impact on partner choice and the subsequent 
union dynamics (Qian & Preston, 1993; Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000). Recent decades have 
witnessed a substantial change in the distributions of educational attainment in the population 
at marriageable age. This should be taken into account when investigating the determinants of 
family formation today. 
Of course, many other factors play a role in the selection process, such as physical 
attractiveness and other social, cultural or economic factors. However, measurements of these 
factors are often not available, while distributions by age, educational level, marital status and 
region usually are readily available. To handle the unknown, Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) posit 
that it is reasonable to assume that individual characteristics like physical attractiveness are 
distributed randomly within key socio-demographic subpopulations. To define the set of 
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suitable mates, groups defined by age, educational level, country and marital status are used to 
set an upper limit on the number of potential partners.  
As the previous overview implicitly suggests, most influential contributions on the 
marriage squeeze have focused on the USA. Recently, however, attention has shifted towards 
Asian countries, which typically show a more dramatic imbalance in the sex ratio (Rallu, 
2006; Jiang et al., 2013; Francis, 2011). Especially in China, the abundance of boys is 
anticipated to have profound and far-reaching consequences (Trent & South, 2011; Tucker & 
Van Hook, 2013). To our knowledge, the number of studies addressing Europe is very limited 
and the available work tends to focus on one single country (e.g., Abrimitzky, 2009; Fraboni 
& Billari, 2001). In this paper, we aim to expand the scope to a broad range of European 
countries. 
 
3. Methods for quantifying the mating squeeze 
Several authors examined how to appropriately define and measure the marriage squeeze. 
These measures can be divided into two broad categories: the first and most common 
approach is based on sex ratios (Akers, 1967; Goldman et al., 1984; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1991), 
the second is based on the harmonic mean consistency condition introduced by Schoen 
(1981). This section first outlines Schoen’s approach and subsequently discusses the sex ratio 
approach in more detail. Schoen’s approach is not often applied, probably due to very strong 
data requirements. Given that the necessary data are not available for a broad range of 
European countries, we do not go into the details of this. Instead, we focus on measures based 
on sex ratios. 
 
3.1 The two-sex problem and Schoen’s harmonic mean consistency condition 
The measures based on sex ratios reflect imbalances between numbers of men and women 
with specified marriage-relevant characteristics. These measures have been used frequently to 
explore implications for family related outcomes such as marriage rates, marital and non-
marital fertility or marital instability. By contrast, Schoen (1983) provides an approach to the 
marriage squeeze which is closely related to what is called the two-sex problem. This two-sex 
problem can be explained as follows.  
Consider a set of observed age-specific male marriage rates and a second set of 
observed age-specific female marriage rates. For these rates to consistently reflect the 
behaviour of a population, the number of marriages implied by male rates must be equal to the 
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number of marriages implied by female rates (Schoen, 1981). The observed marriage rates are 
influenced not only by the age-sex composition of the male and female populations, but also 
by the preferences for opposite-sex partners with a given age. Consider a set of marriage rates, 
given the number of males aged x marrying females aged y equal to the number of females 
aged y marrying males aged x. If we multiply the male rate for (x,y) marriages by the male 
population aged x in a second population with a different age-sex composition, we will obtain 
a hypothetical number of (x,y) marriages (call this Nm), based on the rates observed in the first 
population and the population composition of the second one. However, by multiplying the 
female rate for (x,y) marriages by the number of females aged y in the second population we 
will obtain a hypothetical number of (x,y) marriages (call this Nf), which will be different 
from the hypothetical number Nm implied by the number of men age x (Schoen, 1983). This is 
called the two-sex problem. 
To reconcile these inconsistencies, Schoen (1981) provides an harmonic mean 
consistency condition, later used to define a marriage squeeze index. To do so he introduces 
the notion of rectangular population, which has the same number of persons in each age-sex 
group and is therefore free from marriage squeeze. In other words, since the initial size of the 
male and female cohorts does not change and given fixed marriage preferences and mortality 
rates, period and cohort experiences are constant in the rectangular population and the number 
of males who marry is equal to the number of females who marry. Therefore, if we consider a 
two-sex nuptiality-mortality life table, determined by the given set of marriage preferences 
and mortality rates and by the initial size of male and female birth cohorts, it is possible to 
measure the marriage squeeze as the difference between male and female observed marriage 
rates relative to the total number marriages in a population without any marriage squeeze (i.e. 
the number of marriages derived from the rectangular population). Given fixed underlying 
preferences, this approach implies that the age-sex composition of the population affects the 
number of marriages in a twofold way: directly, with the change in the age-sex distribution 
assuming fixed male and female age specific marriage rates (this can be interpreted as a one-
sex composition effect); and indirectly, through the change in the male and female age-
specific marriage rates induced by the change in the age-sex distribution (Schoen, 1983).  
Applications of Schoen's approach have focused on the indirect effect (i.e., the change 
in the marriage rates due to two-sex composition effects), so they measure the marriage 
squeeze as the change in age- and sex-specific marriage rates produced by changes in the age 
composition of the populations of each sex (Schoen, 1983; Schoen & Kluegel, 1988; Qian & 
Preston, 1993; Qian, 1998; Fraboni & Billari, 2001; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005). Sex ratios are 
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instead used by demographers to capture the total effect (direct plus indirect) produced by the 
observed imbalance in the numbers of men and women with specific marriage-relevant 
characteristics that people consider when looking for a partner (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1991). 
The empirical application of Schoen's two-sex approach requires appropriate data 
showing numbers of marriages cross-tabulated by the ages of the bride and the groom. These 
data are typically not available for cross-country comparison. Since this paper aims to 
reconstruct past and ongoing trends of the education-specific mating squeeze for a broad 
range of European countries, we will stick to measures based on the sex ratio. However the 
comparison between these alternative approaches to the measurement of the marriage squeeze 
should be further explored in more detailed studies addressing one or just a couple of 
countries. 
 
3.2 Measures based on the sex ratio  
In demography, the sex ratio is defined as the number of men divided by the number of 
women and has been computed in a variety of ways, taking into account different marriage-
relevant factors, such as age, relationship status, race (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993; Lloyd & 
South, 1996; Albrecht et al., 1997; Cready, Fossett & Kiecolt, 1997; Crowder & Tolnay, 
2000), income, employment status (e.g., Wilson, 1987; lichter et al., 1991; 1992; 1995), or 
educational attainment (e.g., Goldman et al., 1984; South & Lloyd, 1992; Lewis & 
Oppenheimer, 2000). Below we examine more in detail some of these measures based on sex 
ratios. 
Deviation from a ratio of unity, which indicate an imbalance between the number of 
potential brides and the number of potential grooms, may be caused by a range of factors. For 
example, a shortage of marriageable men (i.e., a marriage squeeze for women) can occur in 
countries suffering severe war losses or in countries where men have exceptionally high 
mortality rates (Jones & Ferguson, 2006; Abrimitzky, 2009). Countries where there is a strong 
cultural preferences for sons rather than daughters, such as China or Korea, are currently 
experiencing a marriage squeeze for men (Rallu, 2006; Trent & South, 2011; Tucker & Van 
Hook, 2013). Sex differences in migration may also lead to an imbalance in the number of 
men and women at the marriageable ages (Goodkind, 1997; Angrist, 2000; Francis, 2011). In 
addition, a marriage squeeze may also be caused by fluctuations in the birth rate, as explained 
in the next section. 
9 
 
3.2.1 Age-specific sex ratios 
Because men tend to marry women who are on average two to three years younger, 
fluctuations in the birth rate cause an imbalance in the number of marriageable men and 
women twenty to twenty-five years later. When birth rates have decreased over time (and 
older cohorts are more numerous than younger ones), men will outnumber women at the 
prime ages of marriage. When birth rates have been rising (and older cohort are smaller than 
younger ones), women will outnumber men at the prime ages of marriage (Akers, 1967; 
Muhsam, 1974).  
Age-specific sex ratios do not only restrict male and female age intervals (typically to a 
width of 5 or 10 years), but are often staggered by two to three years to take into account the 
observed age gap between partners (the mean age difference between spouses has remained 
relatively stable at about 2 to 2.5 years over the past decades). 
A first age-specific measure of the sex ratio was proposed by Akers (1967), to capture 
the variations in marriage trends in the United States during the 1960s caused by what he calls 
a “disproportion between the sexes”. To delimit the age ranges, he first estimated average 
annual first marriage rates by age and sex for the period from 1959 to 1964. Then, he defined 
two age groups, the prime ages of marriage for females (from 18 to 22 years old), and the 
prime ages of marriage for males (from 20.25 to 25.25 years old), so that the midpoint of each 
range is close to the median age at first marriage. The age ranges defined include about 60 
percent of female first marriage and 50 percent of male first marriage, and they also reflect 
mean age difference between brides and grooms.  
Weighted age-specific sex ratios alter age-specific sex ratios to take into account the 
likelihood of marriage at each age, and, thus, a broader age range. For a given age-sex group, 
for example women aged 15 to 24, Akers (1967) computed a weighted sum of men in the age 
group assumed to be suitable for those women, for example men aged 15 to 29. The weights 
reflect the probability of marriage or the strength of preferences for a mate of a given age 
(Akers, 1967; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1991). 
Clearly, there are important consequences arising from the choice of the age range 
width and the age gap between sexes. The practical implications of using different age 
intervals will be discussed in more detail in section 4, when we present the results of 
application to European countries. 
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3.2.2 The Availability Ratio 
The above mentioned sex ratios have been criticized for ignoring the fact that women of a 
given age will be competing with women in other age groups for the same men (and vice 
versa). In order to address this criticism, Goldman et al. (1984) proposed a new measure 
which he called Availability Ratio. This measure incorporates information about both the 
available pool of potential mates and the competition from members of the same sex for that 
pool. One of the main contributions of this paper, besides the fact that it has extended 
conventional age-specific sex ratios by taking into account competition, is that it is one of the 
first methodological studies to include the level of education in the computation of a measure 
of the mate availability as a factor influencing marriage opportunities.  
For a woman of a given age (or age group) and educational level, the Availability Ratio 
is defined as the number of suitable men available to this woman divided by the average 
number of suitable women available to her potential partners: 
 
   
       
      
     
       
 (1) 
where     is the number of suitable men age i in educational level j;      is the number of 
women suitable for the     men. The denominator in the previous equation can be then 
interpreted as the competition by women for the     men in the numerator; it is the average 
number of suitable women for the     men. The interpretation is similar to that of the 
traditional sex ratio. A value of the availability ratio greater than unity implies an excess of 
men and, hence, a marriage market favourable for women. Ratios less than unity indicate a 
deficit of men, meaning an imbalance in the mating pool to the disadvantage of women. When 
any randomly selected woman has one suitable man and that man has only one suitable 
woman, then the AR is equal to one.  
The AR as presented here is computed from the female perspective, but it can easily be 
calculated for men by simply reversing the sexes. Also, additional or alternative criteria for 
suitability can be added, like race, or criteria can be removed from the computations. If only 
age is considered, all elements with subscripts j in equation (1) can be removed.  
As pointed out by the authors, the AR is not equivalent to the probability of the arbitrary 
woman to marry (since her pool of available men has several suitable women from which to 
choose for a mate, she is not certain to marry), but it can be interpreted more as the chances of 
that woman to find a mate.  
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Despite several conceptual advantages, the practical returns of complex measures like 
the weighted-age specific sex ratio and the availability ratio over simpler sex ratio measures 
has not become evident. Both methods imply assumptions about a variety of age constraints, 
generally inferred from the observed percent of recent marriages for each age of bride. These 
constraints should reflect the age preferences of the spouses concerning their propensity to 
marry younger or older partners under favourable condition, e.g. with the same numbers of 
men and women in all ages. However, in reality, people may adapt age preferences in 
response to unbalanced mating pools, and this imbalance in turn is the result of customs and 
changes in preferences. Consequently, trying to define a realistic set of age constraints to 
incorporate into a measure of mate availability is a debatable procedure, which may also lead 
to an endogeneity problem. In this context, this problem arises when a measure that is 
supposed to be a determinant of an outcome actually reflects that outcome itself. 
Moreover, past studies have reported basically the same results, irrespective of whether 
conventional sex ratios where used or the more sophisticated weighted sex ratios and 
availability ratios. In a methodological review of sex ratio measures, Fossett and Kiecolt 
(1991) found weighted sex ratios and availability ratios empirically less adequate than broader 
sex ratios in registering the imbalance between potential mates and the competition for them. 
South and Lloyd (1992) indicate several conceptual advantages in using the availability ratio 
but in general the findings based on less sophisticated measures of mate availability are quite 
similar to those for the availability ratios. Albrecht et al. (1997) did not find significant 
variations in their results when comparing the crude sex ratio and the availability ratio to 
study women preferences in educational homogamy. Goldman et al. (1984) concluded that the 
unweighted availability ratio is interchangeable with the weighted availability ratio. 
In sum, more complex measures derived from sex ratios might entail endogeneity 
problems while they seem to be of limited added value in empirical research. We therefore 
will refrain from using them in our own research. 
 
3.3 Alternative measures of mating market opportunities by education 
The following two approaches offer alternative ways of measuring socio-demographic 
characteristics of the mating market that may affect rates of (assortative) union formation. 
These measures have affinity with the  approaches based on sex ratios even if they do not 
strictly contain a sex ratio. 
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3.3.1 Educational concentration 
Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000) examine educational assortative mating and marriage 
behaviour from an alternative perspective. They shift the focus from sex ratios to marriage 
market concentration. Instead of the sex ratio approach they follow a structural approach 
which emerged from the sociological literature. This approach is concerned with social 
heterogeneity and with how small groups (i.e. local marriage markets) might affect intergroup 
contacts. The variable of interest then becomes the relative group size instead of the  
measurement of the imbalance between potential mates who possess a given feature. In fact, 
even with a perfect balance between men and women, people may still face difficulty in 
finding an appropriate partner if the group of similar potential mates is small relatively to the 
group of dissimilar mates, and this is especially true when considering partners' educational 
level. In order to measure local mate availability from this alternative perspective, Lewis and 
Oppenheimer (2000) introduced a measure called marriage market educational 
concentration. This is the proportion of age-matched potential partners with at least as much 
education as the reference person. For each person of age (or age group) i and educational 
level h, we calculate: 
 
     
 
    
     
 
    
    
     
 
    
     
 
    
    (2) 
where     and     are numbers of single males and females, respectively, of the specified 
age i and education j, and J representing the maximum level of educational attainment. The 
conceptual difference between this measure and the traditional sex ratio is that while the latter 
reflects competition or imbalance between women and men of a specified age and education, 
the concentration indicates the possibility to find an equally or more educated partner and, 
thus, the chance of marrying up on education.  
 
3.3.2 Index of female educational advantage 
To explore the connection between the decreasing trend in hypergamy and the observed 
general increase in female educational attainment, Esteve et al. (2012) proposed a measure of 
female educational advantage. The index represents the probability that the educational 
attainment of a woman picked randomly from the population is higher than the education of a 
man picked randomly from the population. It is defined as follows: 
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where   
  and   
  are respectively the proportions of men and women in educational category 
h (from 1 to 3). As this index is a probability measure, it takes on values between zero and 
one. When      , the educational distributions for women and men are identical, while 
values above (below) 0.5 indicate an higher level of education for women (men) than for men 
(women). Therefore, when     (   .), no man (women) has an educational level higher 
than or equal to that of any woman (man).  
One of the main advantages of this measure over the education-specific sex ratio is that 
it takes into account all educational categories, not just one category (e.g., sex ratio for 
college-educated men and women). This characteristic could be relevant if, for example, we 
want to measure gender inequalities in education among different countries, especially among 
non-Western countries, but may be too broad to capture changes on the college-educated  
marriage market. 
 
4. Empirical applications in European countries 
In order to reconstruct yearly sex ratios by level of education and partnership situation we use 
data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1998 to 2011. The LFS data 
series actually starts from 1983 onwards, but only from 1998 on it reports consistent 
information about educational attainment as well as union status. From 1998, the level of 
education has been harmonized across countries using the ISCED1997 scheme and, moreover, 
from 1998 the partnership situation can be reconstructed not just in terms of formal marital 
status but also taking into account unmarried cohabitation. Joan García-Román and Albert 
Esteve from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics (Barcelona, Spain) were able to construct in a 
consistent way a variable in the LFS that allows us to distinguish between adult persons living 
as singles, in unmarried cohabitation, or married. In particular, information is collected about 
the absence or presence of a cohabiting partner in the household, that, together with the 
evidence from the marital status, allow us to determine and distinguish singles from 
cohabitors.1 The following variables will be used: gender, age, calendar year, level of 
education, country and union status. Through the comparison of the results obtained from 
different data sources, we will check the consistency of the estimates. In all cases, we 
                                                 
1 The variable, namely the "sequence number of spouse or cohabiting partner" is present in the survey since 1983, but only 
from 1998 we dispose of these data. It was introduced to reflect the “de facto” situation in terms of cohabitation arrangements 
and it's used to determine the household type, distinguishing between legal and consensual union. 
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calculate sex ratios from age 25 onwards, since at this age the majority of the population is 
assumed to have reached the final level of educational attainment. 
 
4.1 Age and the age gap between partners 
The essence of the mating squeeze hypothesis is the idea that changes in the age-sex 
composition of the population influence rates of union formation. Because people prefer to 
match on age, mating opportunities are restricted by age. Sex ratio measures are usually 
designed to include certain constraints on the ages of potential men and women, reflecting 
persistent patterns of age at marriage and age differences between partners. Because men tend 
to match with women who are on average 2 to 3 years younger, age ranges for men and 
women are often staggered.  
Figure 1 presents five time series of age-specific sex ratios. The first series represents 
the sex ratio of 25- to 29-year old men and women calculated from the official Eurostat 
population statistics. This series represents a baseline against which to compare the LFS 
estimates. Four series are estimated from the LFS, using four different age ranges for men in 
the numerator (while always counting the number of 25- to 29-year old women in the 
denominator), reflecting the fact that women tend to mate with somewhat older men. Since 
the available international LFS database only publishes ages of the respondents in five year 
age intervals (rather than one year age intervals), we cannot directly count the number of 26, 
27, ... year old men. Instead, we estimated the numbers of men aged 26 to 30 year old by 
taking 4/5 of the number of men aged 25 tot 29 and adding 1/5 of the number of men aged 30 
to 34. Similarly, for estimating the number of men aged 28 to 32, we took 2/5 of the number 
of men aged 25 to 29 and added 3/5 of the number of men aged 30 to 34. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from Figure 1. First, there are a number of countries 
where LFS estimates deviate considerably from the Eurostat population data: there is a 
systematically different trend in Bulgaria and Slovenia; for Romania, the LFS sex ratio is 
systematically higher than the Eurostat baseline; there are smaller but noticeable differences 
also for Germany and Estonia. The match is remarkably good for Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain. 
Second, the sex ratios fluctuate more and tend to be more skewed as the age difference 
between men and women increases. Those fluctuations are caused by several demographic 
factors, including gender differences in mortality and migration, but notably also by 
fluctuations in the birth rate, 25 to 29 years ago. In the absence of any fluctuations in the birth 
rate, in case of constant cohort size, changes in the sex ratio are a function of gender 
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differences in mortality and migration. Because men have higher mortality rates, sex ratios of 
older men to younger women have lower expected values than ratios that do not use age 
differences between sexes. The larger the age difference that is taken into account, the lower 
the expected sex ratio in case of constant cohort size (Goldmand et al., 1984). However, in 
Figure 1, the ratios of somewhat older men to somewhat younger women tend to be higher 
than the ratios of men and women of equal ages (compare the dashed blue lines with the solid 
red lines, respectively). This is the expected result in case of declining birth rates. When birth 
rates are declining, the number of somewhat older people (i.c., men) is higher than the number 
of somewhat younger people (i.c., women); hence the ratio of the former to the latter is 
higher. This explains that the ratio of men aged 28-32 to women aged 25-29 is higher than the 
ratio of both men and women aged 25-29 in most countries and years.  
  
Figure 1. Time series of age-specific sex ratios for different age gaps, irrespective of union 
status, Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimates versus Eurostat population data, 1998-2011 
(log-scale). 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
 
The example of the Czech Republic is most instructive for illustrating this. When age 
differences are not taken into account, the sex ratio follows a flat line between 1998 and 2011 
(solid red line). When we incorporate the fact that men tend to be somewhat older than their 
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female partners, the corresponding sex ratio first decreases and then increases again (dashed 
blue lines). The latter oscillations correspond with the fact that 25 to 29 years earlier, between 
1969 and 1975, the crude birth rate was on the rise in the area currently known as the Czech 
Republic. After that, the birth rate started to decline. A similar story applies to Hungary. By 
contrast, the trends for the United Kingdom exhibit the opposite movement: between 1969 
and 1977 the birth rate was decreasing while after 1977 it was increasing. This translated, 25 
to 29 years later, into a rising sex ratio first and into a declining ratio later on, but only when 
taking into account the age gap between men and women. 
In sum, sex ratios that take into account an age gap between men and women, so 
counting men a bit older than women, fluctuate more than sex ratios that count men and 
women of exactly the same age group. The reason is that fluctuations in cohort size, to a large 
extent determined by fluctuations in the birth rate 25 to 29 years earlier, add variability to the 
former type of sex ratio that is absent in same-age sex ratios. Given that it is a very persistent 
empirical fact that male partners tend to be a couple of years older than female partners, we 
recommend using sex ratios that take this age gap into account. Failing to take differences in 
age between spouses into account might smooth away important fluctuations resulting from 
changes in cohort size. Ignoring the age difference between the sexes would imply that we 
neglect a major component potentially causing a mating squeeze. 
 
4.2 Broad or narrow age ranges? 
There are no clear a priori theoretical reasons for picking a specific age range when 
calculating sex ratios. The only general and obvious guideline is that children and the elderly 
should be excluded from the computations when the primary goal is to study family 
formation. Most age-specific sex ratios are computed using a five-year age span (Fossett and 
Kiecolt, 1991). For example, Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000) consider that women tend to 
choose men who are up to two years younger or up to three years older, while men rather tend 
to pick women who are three years younger to two years older. In line with this, the sex ratio 
for men and women aged 28 will be computed as the number of men aged 26-31 divided by 
the number of women aged 25-30. Grossbard and Amuedo-Dorantes (2007) compute sex 
ratios for five-year age groups by dividing the number of all men two years older by the 
number of all women ages 20-24 or 25-29 (depending on the year of birth). However, some 
scholars argue that these age intervals are too narrow and they prefer to extend the intervals to 
7-years (Lloyd & South, 1996) or 10-years (Lichter et al., 1992; Esteve et al. 2012).  
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In general, the age range should be neither too narrow nor too wide and appropriate to 
the research situation. Fossett & Kiecolt (1991) recommend age range 20-45 as generally 
suitable for studying family formation. However, too broad measures may not be able to 
capture the real effects that may be at work within specific age groups. In contrast, too narrow 
measures may fail to account for the fact that people may look in adjacent age categories 
when they do not find a mate in their own age group. 
Figure 2 shows time series of sex ratios, staggered by two years to count men in the 
numerator who are two years older than the women in the denominator. This is done for 
different sets of age intervals, ranging from a five year to a twenty year age range. Not 
surprisingly, taking broader age ranges smooths away the oscillations associated with 
fluctuations in the birth rate. As just explained, whether this is an advantage or a 
disadvantage, depends on (the assumptions about) the tightness of applicable age norms when 
picking a partner, thus it may depend on historical and regional context. A clear advantage of 
broader age groups is that erroneous, erratic fluctuations are smoothed away as well. This will 
be particularly helpful when sex ratios are reconstructed from data exhibiting substantial 
sampling error, so when the reliability of the data used is limited. This seems to apply to the 
LFS data for Romania, where the sex ratios for 2001 and 2002 are extremely high when a 5 
year age interval is used – the series derived from the official Eurostat population data, shown 
in Figure 1, suggests that the ratio might not have been as extreme in those years. The peak in 
the Romanian series, most likely erroneous, is smoothed away when broader intervals are 
applied. This becomes even more relevant when additional criteria, like educational 
attainment, are added to the picture. 
The most suitable age interval may also depend on the age and sex of the mate 
searching persons considered. More particularly, there is evidence that age sorting norms 
broaden for ageing men. The older the age at which men marry, the more likely they are to 
marry (much) younger women. Thus, for men marrying at older ages, the mean age 
differences is higher than the two-year differences. This is not the case for women, where the 
two to three year age gap seems to remain even up to women marrying at age 50 (Goldman et 
al. 1984: Figure 1; Veevers, 1988). This type of information can be taken into account when 
looking at particular age and gender segments of the mating market. For older unmarried 
cohorts a limited age interval does not capture the demography of the mating market and 
ignores the asymmetrical nature of mating opportunities and practices in terms of age. 
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Figure 2. Sex ratios for different age ranges, in each case with a two year age gap for men 
versus women, LFS data for European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale). 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
 
So, suppose that for men, younger and same-age women are considered suitable 
matches. This seems to imply that the mating market becomes increasingly favourable for 
ageing men, since the age range of suitable women expands as men age. However, this 
doesn’t take into account that they also face competition by younger men, and that the group 
of younger men expands as they get older themselves. In order to take that kind of 
competition into account, Goldman et al. (1984) introduced the Availability Ratio.  
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The availability ratios, as well as the availability indices by Veevers (1988), extend on 
age-specific sex ratios by including competition from members of the same sex in other age 
categories. If we take the example of the 28-year old women, the number of men available is 
specified as the number of men 26 to 31. But the denominator of a simple sex ratio (say the 
number of women aged 24 to 29) does not take into account all the competition for those 26 
to 31 year old men. A much broader age-group than only women 24 to 29-years old are 
available to them. This broader group of women (“competing” for the men in the numerator) 
is typically included in the denominator of an availability indicator. As a result, the 
availability measures tend to be lower than other marriage market measures. 
Figure 3 presents AR’s when only age and sex are taken into account as criteria for 
defining suitability; so we have dropped subscript j from equation (1) and look only at 
subscript i for age. The AR’s for men are calculated such that all women above age 25 are 
counted as suitable for men as long as they are younger or belong to the same age group as the 
men at a given age. The AR’s for women are calculated on the assumption that men are only 
counted as suitable by women if they belong to the same age group as the women themselves. 
Figure 3 shows that such assumptions would imply a balanced availability of potential 
partners at age 25-29, but with increasing age, the marriage market becomes increasingly 
unfavourable for women and increasingly favourable for men.  
So, after all, the conclusion drawn from the more sophisticated analysis based on AR’s 
confirms the intuition that would come from calculating simple sex ratios. If men perceive 
younger women as suitable as women of their own age group, then the simple ratio of men of 
that age group to all same-age or younger women would show the decreasing trend, reflecting 
the fact that women from a broader age interval are counted in the denominator. The 
usefulness of doing more complicated calculations for obtaining the AR’s is therefore 
questionable. Also, the results of this approach heavily depend on assumptions about 
“suitability”, and the validity of these assumptions may be questioned as well. 
To avoid relying on a priori assumptions about suitability, an option would be to use 
the age distribution of actual brides and grooms, instead of making speculations about the 
ages that individuals might prefer in marriage, and thus rely on what they actually do. 
Goldman et al. (1984) included in their AR all ages at which at least two percent of marriages 
occur. Veevers (1988) specified an age range within which 80% of all marriages for persons 
of a given age occur. These age ranges are different for men and women. When we take age 
ranges from the same size and imply a minimum and maximum age, we cover a lower 
percentage of marriage for grooms. For example Akers (1967) opted for a five-year span 
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around the median age at first marriage. The range for females was set at 18 through 22 years 
and covered about 60% of female first marriages. For males the range was set at 20.25 to 
25.25 years and covered about 50% of the male first marriages. As an alternative approach, he 
introduced weighted age-specific sex ratios. For a given reference group, for example women 
aged 15 to 24, men of all adult age groups are counted. The numbers of men in each age 
category are then weighted by the proportions of marriages with men of that age. Also 
Goldman et al. (1984) calculated a weighted version of their availability ratio to take into 
account that the preferences for a partner of a similar age is higher that the preference of a 
partner at the extreme of the formulated age range, but the results of the weighted measure of 
availability was similar to the unweighted measure. An important drawback of these 
empirically derived marriage market measures is that they not only reflect existing marriage 
preferences, but also the adjustment to the supply and demand of the marriage market at that 
time. The validity of relying on those (empirically based) measures is questionable as well.  
 
Figure 3. Availability ratio (AR) by age and gender, European countries, 2011 (log-scale), 
assuming that younger as well as same-age women are suitable to men, while only men of the 
same age group are considered suitable by women 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
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Summing up, in their methodological review of the sex ratio Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) 
conclude that computing age-specific sex ratios with and without the two-year age difference, 
the weighted age-specific sex ratio and the availability ratio are close substitutes for each 
other at younger ages. At older ages, the mean of the availability ratio tends to be much lower 
for women compared to other measures. Since all these measures are highly correlated with 
the crude sex ratio of men to women aged 15-44 and perform as good in their analyses when 
predicting marriage and family formation, Fossett and Kiecolt conclude that the advantage of 
computing more refined sex ratio measures is questionable, at least for younger adults in the 
prime ages for union formation. They actually advise to use sex ratios based on the broad age-
ranges 15 to 44, since it does not only measure the number of available mates but implicitly 
also takes into account the competitors for those available mates. However, for older adults, it 
may be useful to take into account that marriage market conditions shift over the life course: 
the circumstances shaping the mating process differ significantly for persons aged 35 to 44 
compared to persons aged 25 to 34. This holds even more so when we take into account 
educational assortative mating. This is considered more in detail in the next section. 
 
4.3 Level of education 
Age distributions and distributions of educational attainment have changed substantially 
among the marriageable populations in past decades and several studies have pointed out the 
impressive increase in female education opportunities and attainment (Shofer & Meyer, 
2005). Together with the expansion of higher education among women we can observe a 
significant decrease in the gender gap in education as shown in The Global Gender Gap 
Report (Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi, 2012).  
Educational attainment has become one of the most important factors in the mating 
process (Mare, 1991; Smits et al., 1998; Schwarts & Mare, 2005; Van Bavel, 2012). The 
traditional pattern of educational assortative mating that we observed so far involved a 
combination of educational homogamy, female hypergamy and male hypogamy (i.e. women 
marry men at least as highly educated as themselves, and men marry women at most as highly 
educated as themselves). This pattern was compatible with the earlier distribution of 
educational attainment by sex, counting more highly educated men than women. Since this 
imbalance in education has turned around, this may lead to a new kind of mating squeeze 
(Van Bavel, 2012).  
Given the recent reversal of the gender imbalance in education, we may expect that an 
increasing proportion of highly educated women and low educated men face increasing 
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difficulties in finding a suitable partner. In order to measure the dimensions of this education-
specific mating and marriage squeeze we will reconstruct time series of sex ratios by level of 
education in the reproductive ages. We decided to reduce the number of educational 
categories to three: low (lower secondary schooling or less), medium (upper- or 
postsecondary schooling completed but no tertiary), and high (first or second stage of tertiary 
schooling, i.e. university level). This division may seem somewhat crude but it is appropriate 
for our research scope, which is to show the imbalance of the marriage market participation in 
particular among highly educated persons. We focus here on the highly educated since this is 
where most of the changes and differences are occurring – in most European countries, 
education is compulsory up to the secondary level. 
Figure 4 displays time series of sex ratios for the highly educated for three different age 
intervals: two five year age intervals (women aged 25-29 / men aged 27-31 next to women 
aged 35-39 / men aged 37-41) and a broad age interval (women aged 25-44 / men aged 27-
46). At least three observations stand out. First, as expected, these education-specific sex 
ratios tend to be lowest for the youngest age group in most countries, in line with the 
relatively recent reversal of gender inequality in higher education. Second, in most countries, 
there were already more highly educated women than highly educated men at the start of this 
time series (i.e., the year 1998), which is in line with longer time series based on other data 
(see Van Bavel 2012: Figure 1). Third, the time series for the broadest age interval is the most 
stable one; it exhibits the lowest number of erratic fluctuations. This represents an advantage 
in case these fluctuations are due to sampling error in the LFS, and it is also in line with the 
recommendation by Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) to use broad intervals when calculating sex 
ratios. However, in case the fluctuations in the smaller age intervals would represent real 
changes rather than errors, using the more stable series for the broad age intervals would miss 
out potentially important forces affecting union formation. Still, as a general rule, and 
following the conclusion drawn from previous discussions, we recommend using the broader 
and more stable age interval. 
 
4.4 Union status 
In addition to age and education, union status might also be taken into account. Several 
scholars argue that the ratio of single males to single females is a better measure of the 
marriage squeeze (Akers, 1967; Muhsam, 1974;  Lichter et al. 1992; Lloyd & South, 1996; 
Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005). However, in their methodological 
review, Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) examined whether sex ratios for unmarried persons aged 
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15-44 differ from sex ratios for all persons. They concluded that sex ratios computed for 
unmarried persons do not predict measures of marriage with greater precision than sex ratios 
for all persons. The only difference is that sex ratios for unmarried persons have slightly 
higher mean values and greater variability.  
 
Figure 4. Sex ratios for people with a degree in tertiary education, three different age 
intervals, European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale).* 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
* See the discussion of Figure 1 for the way the numbers in the male intervals had to be estimated 
 
Apart from formal marital status, another issue is how to deal with unmarried 
cohabitation, an issue of major importance in the European family landscape of today. 
Goldman et al. (1984) were among the first in the relevant literature to define being single not 
only as being unmarried, but also as not cohabiting and excluded from their availability ratio 
also men and women in unmarried cohabitation. 
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Figure 5 plots time series of sex ratios for a broad age range of people with a degree in 
tertiary education: men aged 27 to 46 divided by women aged 25 to 44. The solid lines are for 
all these people irrespective of their union status. The dashed lines are only for people who 
are single, in the sense of not being in a coresidential union (married or not). Figure 6 gives 
the same information for younger people (men aged 27-31 / women aged 25-29), and Figure 7 
does the same for older men and women (men aged 42-46 / women aged 40-44).  
 
Figure 5. Sex ratios for people with a degree in tertiary education, singles versus all union 
statuses, men aged 27-46 / women aged 25-44, European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale).* 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
* See the discussion of Figure 1 for the way the numbers in the male intervals had to be estimated 
 
A number of observations can be derived from these figures. First, they confirm the 
observation by Fossett and Kiecolt (1991) that ratios for singles are less stable. This is 
probably to some extent due to increasing sampling error as the numbers get smaller. Second, 
for the younger age group (men 27-31/women 25-29) the sex ratios for singles correspond to 
the sex ratios for all union statuses. This is also the case when sex ratios are based on broad 
age ranges, except for Slovak Republic, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and 
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Iceland where the sex ratios for singles have lower values, meaning that for highly educated 
single women sex ratios are even more unfavourable. Third, for the older age group (men 42-
46/women 40-44) the sex ratios for singles deviate from the sex ratios for all persons. The sex 
ratios for singles are in all countries more skewed, indicating that for older (higher educated) 
single women the marriage market turns out to be more disadvantaged.   
 
Figure 6. Sex ratios for people with a degree in tertiary education, singles versus all union 
statuses, men aged 27-31 / women aged 25-29, European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale).* 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
* See the discussion of Figure 1 for the way the numbers in the male intervals had to be estimated 
 
Even if there may be conceptual reasons for excluding  those who are currently living 
with a partner when defining the pool of potential suitable mates, empirical results have 
shown that sex ratios for single persons are often very highly correlated with sex ratios for all 
persons. For this reason many scholars found it unnecessary to compute sex ratios for singles 
only (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993; Cready et al., 1997; Albrecht et al.,1997; Angrist, 2000; 
Albrecht & Albrecht, 2001; Grossbard & Ameudo-Dorantes, 2007).  
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Figure 7. Sex ratios for people with a degree in tertiary education, singles versus all union 
statuses, men aged 42-46 / women aged 40-44, European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale).* 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonized LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
* See the discussion of Figure 1 for the way the numbers in the male intervals had to be estimated 
 
Moreover, using measures of the mating squeeze that include only single men and 
women may cause problems of endogeneity, when the effect of a sex ratio on union formation 
is estimated while the sex ratio for singles is obviously, by construction, affected by the rates 
of union formation and union dissolution. Any statistical association between the sex ratio and 
the rates of union formation and dissolution will then not just reflect the effect of the mating 
squeeze on the rate of union formation, but also the reversal causal effect. 
 
4.5 Geographic scope 
It is not straightforward to delimit the geographic scope of a marriage market. The first 
studies on the marriage squeeze typically treated countries as marriage markets (Akers, 1967; 
Muhsam, 1974; Schoen, 1983; South, 1988; South & Trent, 1988). This was often a practical 
choice, because calculating region-specific rates was often not possible with the available 
data. However, for a country like the United States, where the majority of the studies took 
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place, this is clearly inaccurate. For illustration, this approach is similar to treating Europe as 
a single marriage market (if we only consider size and leave the linguistic diversity that exists 
in Europe aside).  
Since marriage markets are limited geographically for numerous reasons, subsequent 
studies analyzed states (Schoen & Wooldredge, 1989; South & Lloyd, 1992), metropolitan 
areas (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993), counties (Cready et al., 1997) or multicounty units like the 
382 labour market areas (LMAs) identified in the PUMS-D of the 1980 U.S. decennial census 
(Tolbert & Killian, 1987). For many scholars the LMAs represent an appropriate geographic 
scale, because they are not bounded by state lines nor do they only focus on urban centres, but 
are constructed around the daily journey-to-work patterns. Moreover, LMAs provide an easy 
way to quantify local marriage markets and to take into account the local economic conditions 
(Lichter et al., 1991). This is important because regions where primary industries dominate, 
like Newfoundland, Maine, Montana, and Utah attract many men. Whereas capital cities with 
a large public sector, such as Ottawa or Washington, attract many women (Hooper & 
England, 1988; Hamilton & Otterstad, 1998).  
In addition, there is a broad range of research that examine alternative ways to delimit 
marriage markets. Typically, these studies try to capture the settings where potential partners 
could meet, like the workplace, the neighbourhood, at school or in college (Kalmijn & Flap, 
2001; Uecker & Regnerus, 2010). This stems from the idea that the choice of partners is not 
only affected by preferences and availability of desired traits, but also by the opportunities to 
meet and interact. However, the search for a partner involves many more dimensions of our 
life, including friends and family, leisure activities, travel, internet, and many more. The 
importance of those places varies by context, age and the like. Trying to specify the place of 
interaction where we encounter our potential spouse is complex and not useful for our 
objectives.  
In order to illustrate the variety in terms of education-specific sex ratios within 
countries, Figure 8 presents a map with sex ratios for people aged 30 to 34 with a degree in 
tertiary education for the European NUTS 1  regions (European Commission, 2003). These 
regions are one level below the country level and allow to distinguish between regions like 
Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium, or North, Centre, and South Italy.  
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Figure 8. Sex ratios for people aged 30 to 34 with a degree in tertiary education, European 
NUTS 1 regions, 2011  
 
 
Overall, the regional education-specific sex ratios tend to be similar within countries. 
Major exceptions include the southern regions (Länder) in Germany, Western Austria, and 
Northeast Spain: in these regions, there is a male majority of college graduates while there is a 
female majority in the other regions of the same country. These major deviations need to be 
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taken into consideration when working on the national level. Apart from that, there is also a 
remarkable East-West divide in the UK. 
 
4.6 Migrant status 
Finally, the LFS also allows us to calculate separate sex ratios for native and migrant 
populations. These might be useful to assess the role played by this characteristic of the 
mating market on patterns of ethnic or migrant endogamy and exogamy. Figure 9 presents sex 
ratios for men aged 27-46 / women aged 25-44 for highly educated natives versus highly 
educated immigrants. Immigrants are defined as people born outside the country. 
For a couple of countries, the number of immigrants in the LFS is so low that the 
estimates for that group turn erratic. This seems to be the case in Bulgaria, Poland, and 
Slovenia. Next, there are a number of countries where the sex ratio for the highly educated is 
systematically higher among the immigrants than among natives. Such is the case in Belgium, 
France, Hungary and Latvia. In these countries, the female advantage in education, if any, is 
more pronounced in the native population. The opposite happens in the Netherlands, Austria, 
Cyprus, and Italy, where the sex ratio for the highly educated is higher for natives than for 
immigrants. In the latter group of countries, the female advantage in education, if any, tends 
to be bigger among immigrants.  
The usefulness of these kinds of statistics has some clear limitations. First, there is a 
lack of detail about the origin of the immigrants. Given the fact that people tend to mate with 
people of similar origin (e.g., Dutch immigrants in Belgium marrying with Dutch 
immigrants), this is a major drawback which makes it impossible to relate these sex ratios to 
any specific tendencies for endogamy. Second, these statistics do not tell us anything about 
the ethnic background of the men and women counted. For example, men and women whose 
parents were born in Morocco, but who were born in Belgium themselves, are counted in the 
group of natives along with men and women without any migration background in the recent 
family history, even though the tendency for ethnic endogamy is strong (with men and women 
of Moroccan background more likely to form a union). 
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Figure 9. Sex ratios for people with a degree in tertiary education, natives versus immigrants, 
men aged 27-46/ women aged 25-44, European countries, 1998-2011 (log-scale).* 
 
Source: Eurostat harmonzid LFS, data prepared by Joan Garcia-Román & Albert Esteve, own calculations 
* See the discussion of Figure 1 for the way the numbers in the male intervals had to be estimated 
 
5. Conclusion 
Originally, the marriage squeeze refers to the effect of the imbalance between the number of 
men and women of marriageable ages on marriage rates. In this paper, we proposed an update 
of the marriage squeeze concept so that it incorporates not only age and sex but two other 
marriage-relevant characteristics: education and union status. With the education-specific 
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mating squeeze we introduce a framework to measure the effect of the reversal of gender 
imbalances in education on union and family formation and aim to build new bridges between 
two classic areas in the study of union formation: the marriage squeeze hypothesis and trends 
in educational assortative mating.  
In the literature, there is no general agreement on how the marriage squeeze should be 
operationalized. Most studies compute sex ratios, sometimes in very refined ways, but Schoen 
(1983) and Esteve et al. (2012) offer alternative approaches that have not yet been compared 
to the sex ratio approach. We focus on sex ratios to reconstruct time series of the education-
specific mating squeeze for European countries and take a closer look at the practical 
consequences that arise when measuring the mating squeeze.  
We demonstrated that sex ratios are sensitive to the assumed age difference between men 
and women. We recommend to take a two- or three year age difference into account, because 
failing to do this will miss out potentially important temporal variation in the mating squeeze. 
On the other hand, computing sex ratios for five- or for ten-year age groups generate more or 
less the same results. We should be cautious with measures based on very small age intervals 
since they are more liable to erratic fluctuations caused by sampling errors. Broader age 
groups proof to be more robust. In addition, they do not only include a larger pool of potential 
available mates, but also the competition from members of the same sex for that pool. As 
such, with sex ratios calculated for broad age ranges, some of the conceptual advantages of 
more sophisticated Availability Ratios are obtained in an implicit but simpler way.  
Measures based on very broad age ranges (say 30 years) or crude sex ratios may not be able 
to detect a marriage squeeze and disregard the fact that marriage market conditions, including 
age preferences, for younger adults differ from marriage market conditions for older adults. 
For older adults, and in particular for older men, the age sorting norms are less strict, so 
broader age ranges are recommended.  
In addition, we showed that for older adults sex ratios computed for singles are more 
skewed and deviate from sex ratios computed for all marital statuses. For younger adults, this 
is not the case. For younger adults, sex ratios computed for singles are similar to sex ratios 
computed for all persons.  
While it is intuitively appealing to exclude those who are living with a partner from 
marriage market measures, this is not always preferred. Sex ratios based on the single 
population can cause problems of endogeneity, since the number of single men and women is 
also an outcome of union formation and union dissolution. This is in general a problem with 
more complex sex ratio measures that constrain the marriage market too much. These 
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constrains are based on observed practices which not only reflect existing preferences but also 
the accommodation to the supply and demand of the marriage market at that time. As a result, 
they entail endogeneity issues. In some cases, if data allow doing this, these issues may be 
addressed by linking sex ratio measures at time t1 with rates of union formation at time t2. 
As mentioned before, most studies of the mating and marriage squeeze so far have relied 
on measures based on the sex ratio. Still, Schoen (1983) and Esteve et al. (2012) offer 
alternative approaches that have hardly been tried and tested in studies of union formation and 
assortative mating. This is a job still to be done in future studies. 
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